IRELAND’S BUDGET......A BETTER WAY TO PLAN THE NATIONS’ FINANCES

Work is now intensifying on the preparation of the budget for 2013.

It is part of a process of reducing the gap between revenue and spending (including spending on interest payments) to   3% of GDP, in accordance with EU rules and the Maastricht Treaty which the Irish people approved in 1992. This reducing of the gap is called ”fiscal consolidation”.

In 2009, the fiscal consolidation was 7.6 billion euros, 

in 2010, 6.4 billion,

in 2011, 6.1 billion, and

in 2012, 3.8 billion.

 

In the budget now under preparation, a consolidation of a further 3.5 billion has to be made for 2013.
For 2014, a consolidation of an extra 3.1 billion euros must be made.
And , finally, to  get on target, yet another consolidation of 2 billion  must be made for 2015.
While these figures show that a consolidation of 22 billion has already been made, and the remaining consolidation is “only” 6.6 billion, the truth is that the further one goes along a road like this, the harder it gets.

The “easy” tax increases or spending reductions are made in the earlier rounds, and the much harder ones tend to get postponed to the later stages. We are now getting to the hard part.

I think there is a strong argument for announcing, upfront next month, a full programme of all the  cuts and tax increases  for all three remaining  years- 2013,2014 and 2015. We should have a three year budget, rather than a one year one.

Doing the job one year at a time adds to the uncertainty, and does not reduce the pain. It also prevents people seeing what the real alternatives are.
The last time Ireland faced a similar crisis , in 1981, I was the Minister for Finance. Within 4 weeks of taking office I introduced and passed an emergency budget in July 1981.
I then prepared a White Paper on how the country could avoid getting into the same sort of mess again.

It  was entitled “A Better Way to Plan the Nation’s Finances”. Unfortunately, because the Government had no Dail majority, and fell on the proposed budget for 1982, I did not get a chance to implement the reforms I had proposed in the White Paper.
But the reforms proposed in that paper are just as relevant to today’s problem, as they were to those of the early 1980’s.

In “A Better Way to Plan the Nations Finances,  I suggested a new timetable for budget preparation for the following year which would see the proposed tax and spending measures published  in the previous October, allowing 2-3 months for debate, and even changes, before the measures took effect.

The 1981 White paper suggested that the budget be  accompanied by estimates of the tax changes and spending  changes that would be needed to stay on track for the subsequent  two years....a sort of three year budget. That would have taken a lot of the secrecy out of budget preparation, and given everybody a greater sense of involvement with the choices that had to be made, and a sense of   how difficult they were.

By having the debates ahead of time, the possibility would be opened up of making amendments in a non dramatic way.  It would not be so much a question of dramatic “climb downs” and “U turns”, but rather of listening and learning from rational debate.
And the  1981 White Paper suggested a  change to Dail procedure to allow opposition parties to make detailed  proposals for amendments to spending plans, so long as they put forward equally detailed alternative ways of bridging the gap.

It also proposed an independent Public Expenditure Commissioner who would analyse the choices for the Dail.

It seems to me that it would be very helpful today if information was published, on a regular basis, by someone like a Public Expenditure Commissioner, comparing different types of public spending  and tax breaks here, with those applying in other  jurisdictions, like Northern Ireland, Germany or Spain.
For example, we could usefully know how things like

 medical consultant’s salaries,
 teacher’s salaries,
 public service pensions, and
 jobseekers allowances,
 here compared with the other places.

It would also be useful to be regularly informed what particular medical procedures cost in different hospitals in Ireland, and in hospitals in other countries.
One could also compare the unit costs of the courts and legal proceedings, and of prison services here with other countries.
 

Publishing this sort of information routinely, and setting out the budget over three years ahead, would make the Government’s political task easier. And  it would help people to see where their money was going and why.

WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THE EU BROKE UP?

I have attended a number of conferences in the past few weeks where the future of the European Union has been discussed. Where previously the EU’s continuance was complacently taken for granted, now there is much more uncertainty, but also much more interest.

The European Union has been a remarkably successful institution building project. It is the first ever voluntary coming together of sovereign states, pooling some of their sovereignty, so that they could do more together, than they could separately.

Almost every other political unification or state building in history has involved the use of force, including the creation of the UK and the maintenance of the USA. The EU came together peacefully and voluntarily.

Some might argue that the EU was necessary only in order to cement a post war reconciliation of Germany and France and that, now that that is achieved, it has done its job and needs no further development.

This is wrong for two reasons.

WHY THE EU IS STILL AN ASSET

1 . AN ASSURANCE OF MUTUAL SECURITY,

 Firstly, the fact that there is a queue of states still lining up to join the EU shows that the EU still provides a necessary political and economic umbrella under which reconciliation and mutual security between states can be  assured in the twenty first century.

This was why the Baltic states, Poland and other central European states joined, and it is the reason several Balkan states, and even Georgia and Ukraine might like to do so. It is also the reason why Greece, much to the surprise of many, has favoured Turkish membership. While the United States of America is remarkably successful in many ways, there is no queue of other American states lining up to join. Even Puerto Rico has not done so after more than 100 years of Washington rule

2. A WAY TO MANAGE GLOBALISATION DEMOCRATICALLY

Secondly, the EU is the most advanced effort in the world providing a measure of democratic supervision into globalisation. Unlike other efforts to supervise globalisation, like the United Nations and the World Trade Organisation, the EU has a directly elected Parliament which co legislates for the EU alongside the 27 Governments, who often decide issues by majority. Other international organisations operate on a purely intergovernmental basis, which means that there has to be unanimity to get a decision, and democratic involvement only arises when a deal already negotiated in private, has to be ratified in national parliament  without possibility of further negotiation or amendment.

As a result, other organisations, like and the WTO and the UN, can do much less, and have to  do much more of what they do behind closed doors, than is the case with the EU.

My view is that the EU provides a unique model for democratic rule making, at supra national level, something which will become more, not less, necessary as we proceed into the 21^st century.

  Indeed the failure of the world to deal with climate change is a good example of the weaknesses of present intergovernmental models of global governance. If the different regions of the world had Unions, like the EU, which could negotiate seriously, and with genuine political legitimacy, as the EU can, the failures of Copenhagen and other climate change summits would not have happened.

If the EU were to break up, either because of the collapse of the euro or because a major country like the UK feels it has to exercise its right to leave the EU, and either event were to set off a breakdown of the trust that keeps the EU itself together, we would have lost a unique instrument for security building in Europe, and for problem solving in the wider world.

I would now like to analyse those two potentially existential threats to the EU, the euro crisis, and the UKs possible desire to leave.

Of these, a  break up  the euro is undoubtedly  by far the  more serious existential threat to the EU, because the scale of the economic losses is potentially much greater, and the  means of controlling  those losses, are much less.

THE EURO CRISIS IS NOT SOLVED

The euro crisis has become slightly less acute in recent weeks. The announcement of a new bond buying policy by the European Central Bank has calmed the markets. But there is no doubt that the markets will test the ECB’s will power at some stage.

Meanwhile the link between the solvency of European banks and the solvency of European states has not been removed.

 A default by any EU state would wreck the banks of that state, because each state’s banks tend to be big  purchasers of the bonds of that state.

Similarly a potential collapse of a bank in a state would force that state to inject capital into banks, if it did not want a run on banks generally to take place, and contagion to other countries. The  confidence loss caused by a major bank getting into difficulty could lead to a dramatic collapse in state revenues, leaving it with a much increased budget deficit, at the very time it was also having to find the money to recapitalize the bank.

FOUR THINGS THAT MUST BE DONE TO SOLVE IT

If these problems are to be resolved, four things will have to happen, more or less at the same time.

1. Greek Government debt will have to be forgiven.

2. The ESM will have to be seen to be big enough to stand behind Spain and other countries that might get into difficulty, on a contingency basis,

3. The new mechanisms to supervise, and if necessary rationalize, Europe’s banks will have to be put in place.

4. The already agreed reforms to reduce deficits, and to promote growth by opening up the job and service markets to competition will have to be demonstrated to be being fully implemented, in letter and spirit, to show creditors that, if one forgives debt or creates enlarged the ESM, one is not throwing good money after bad.

At the moment, the Greek debt issue is not being tackled, and seems to have been postponed until after the German election in September. The delay may not be the worst thing in the world, if it allows time for Greek reforms to begin to establish credibility. It also allows time to educate public opinion in creditor countries like Germany, and in countries sitting complacently on the sidelines, of the true consequences for themselves of a euro break up. Greece also need immediate help to finance itself to the end of 2013, and that bridging finance cannot await elections in Germany or anywhere else.

The EU has already enacted a raft of legislation, including the Fiscal Compact Treaty, to ensure that countries reduce their deficits, and liberalise their labour and service markets. . One of the reasons growth potential has been low in Greece, Italy, and Spain is lack of competition or flexibility in key sectors

But Germany is not yet satisfied. It wants to have an EU Commissioner with the power to veto state budgets, and enforceable contracts on reforms between states and the EU.  But not enough attention is being paid to the fact that Germany, France and other core countries could also be doing a lot more themselves, to open up their own digital, financial, energy, retail and professional service markets. While Germany has set a good example in labour market and pension reform,  there are other reforms it could initiate, that would help other EU countries to sell more goods and services into the German market, and thereby trade their way out of their problems.

There is understandable political resistance in Germany to any further debt forgiveness for Greece. But debt forgiveness within the euro is one thing. Greek exit from the euro is an entirely different matter. It would be far more dangerous, and that needs to be explained to German public opinion.

WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THE EURO ZONE BROKE UP?

Even a disorderly default by a country within the euro, no matter how severe its consequences for its own people and for its creditors, would have far less severe consequences for the euro, and for the EU itself, than an exit of a country from the euro would have.

I have heard a view from some Northern Europeans that an orderly exit of Greece from the euro could be contemplated, if it was accompanied by building up a huge fund, much bigger than the existing ESM, to stand behind all the other euro area states, so as to prevent a Greek exit leading to a loss of confidence in the financial position of the rest of the euro zone.

I believe this view, that Greek exit from the euro can be managed, is profoundly mistaken.

The whole edifice of the EU rests on law. The EU has no police force to enforce its will. It relies on member states freely respecting the interpretation of EU law by the European Court of Justice, and implementing the Court’s decision, however unpleasant that may be. The exit of a country from the euro is, quite simply, a breach of their Treaty obligations, and treaty obligations have the force of law.

The euro was established on the basis that it was irreversible. A Greek exit, particularly if it was condoned or encouraged by other members, would say loudly that the euro is not irreversible.

That would lead to constant speculation in the markets as to who would be next. And as speculation increased, so too would the size of the funds or guarantees needed to check it, increase. That in turn would then lead heightened risk that some of creditor countries, who would have to provide these funds and guarantees, might decide that they themselves should exit the euro, and re-establish their own currencies. That would be the end of the euro.

Breakups of currency unions have happened before, in Austro Hungary after the First World War, and in Eastern Europe in the 1990s when the rouble zone broke up. As described in a recent article by Anders Aslund of the Peterson Institute of International Economics, the consequences of this were disastrous.

A  SCENARIO THAT MIGHT LEAD TO THE END OF THE EU ITSELF

New currencies would have to be established. The relative value of these currencies would be unknown and unknowable. Some would lose value very quickly and others would shoot up in value.

Exports would become dramatically uncompetitive in some cases, and in others they would become  so cheap that there would be  accusations of dumping, currency manipulation, and calls for  immediate reintroduction of  import duties to level the playing field. Such duties, if imposed, would  end the Single Market.  And that would be tantamount to the break up of the European Union itself. Open markets, the assumption on which Ireland built it entire economy over the last 50 years, would be gone.

In some countries the banking system would break down, and people would have no access to credit for even the most basic transactions.

In others, people would cease to trust the value of their own money, and money, after all, is based on a promise and if people can no longer trust the states standing behind the promise that underlies their money, the basis for money itself is gone.

This is not fiction. It is what happened when the rouble zone broke up in the 1990s and explains why incomes fell by 50% in the former rouble zone countries. And the exporter nations within the rouble zone, like the Russian Federation, suffered just as much hardship as the importer nations, like Latvia and Estonia.

The political stresses that this scenario for the 500 million people of the EU, and their Governments, would be such that trust between European nations would easily break down completely.

We see signs of that happening already, but it is being held in check by the hope that problems can still be resolved on a collective basis. A break up of the euro would show that that was impossible to resolve matters on a collective basis, and it would then be a case of every nation for itself, with particularly severe consequences for smaller countries, like Ireland.

............AND MEANWHILE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

As if Europe did not have enough problems, one important EU country, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, is preparing to renegotiate the terms of its own membership of the EU, and hold a referendum on the outcome, which would potentially decide whether the UK would stay in the EU or leave.

The first thing to say is that the UK is entirely free to do this. Unlike other Unions, like the United States or the United Kingdom itself, the European Union is a Union which states are free to leave, so long as they fulfil their normal obligations under international law, which arise when any country withdraws from any international treaty.

The UK has been an uneasy member of the EU from the outset. While Churchill envisaged a United States of Europe, he did not envisage the UK, which still had a global Empire at the time, being part of it. The UK did not attend the 1955 conference in Messina which led to the Treaty of Rome. When it eventually joined the Common Market, a decision endorsed by a referendum, the idea was sold to the electorate as an economic arrangement, whereas even the most cursory reading of the Treaty of Rome would have shown it to be much more than that.

A THREAT TO VETO THE EU BUDGET

The United Kingdom is now threatening to veto the entire EU budget,  something it is legally entitled to do, unless there is an absolute freeze on the size of the budget. The difficulty with this stance is not legal, it is political.

 The EU Single market, which guarantees free movement of people, goods and services, was created as a political deal.

 Weaker economies opened up their markets to stronger ones, and removed protection from local businesses, on the basis of a promise that they would qualify for structural funds to modernise their economies. These funds are what the EU budget provides. (Some of the EU budget also goes on agriculture, but that has fallen from almost 80% of the total originally, to only 30% today.)

The political difficulty with the UK stance is that of fairness.

In the past, when countries like Ireland, Spain, Greece, Portugal, and even the UK itself, joined the EU, we all qualified for very substantial EU structural funds, in the form of aid for agricultural modernisation, general infrastructure, training, communications etc.

Now, when the EU has taken in 12 central European countries who are almost all relatively far poorer by comparison with the rest of the EU,  than we were when we  joined, these 12 are to be told, if the freeze the UK  wants is to go into effect, that they are not to get even a fraction of the help Ireland, Spain, regions of the UK and others qualified for as of right after we joined. This is causing resentment.

I heard an Estonian Minister complain recently that, under the existing EU budget which is already an unfair compromise, his farmers have to compete in the same EU market with west European farmers who are getting three times the subsidies. Unless there are to be drastic cuts, this sort of anomaly can only be put right by an increase in the EU budget.

The problem is that the UK Government has made the size of the budget a red line issue without getting into any informed debate about what the money is actually spent on, or about what sort of EU budget is necessary to ensure that the  EU Single Market, to which the UK itself is very much attached, works fairly and is preserved.

The UK wants access to the single market, but is not prepared to pay any entry fee.

AND A DEMAND TO RENEGOTIATE THE ENTIRE BASIS OF UK MEMBERSHIP OF THE EU

The same problem arises in the renegotiation of the terms of UK membership for which the current  UK Government wants. In preparation for this renegotiation, the UK Government is now doing a comprehensive audit of all EU laws, to identify areas of activity that could be taken back from the EU to be administered exclusively under UK law instead. There may be some good ideas emerging from this, on which all other members could agree, but there may also be a lot of problems.

The difficulty is that the UK wants to take back, yet to be specified, powers, but also to retain full and unfettered access for all its goods and service exports to the EU Single market. 50% of UK exports go to the euro zone, whereas only 15% if euro zone exports go to the UK, so this is important to the UK.

The difficulty is that the EU Single Market, like any market, is a product of common rules, regulations and conventions. A market is a political construct. Without common rules or understandings nobody could rely on what they were buying.

That is why, for example, there have to be common EU quality standards to construct a common EU market. Otherwise one country could impose peculiar quality standards, designed to exclude competitors from its market and to enable its own producers to make monopoly profits at the expense of its consumers. Any rulemaking power that could be abused in this way, cannot be handed back to national level without endangering the Single Market. That is the problem that the proposed UK renegotiation of  its EU membership terms will encounter.

And the competition in any market also has to be fair, and someone has to regulate that. If competitors have different environmental, or product liability standards, or if some firms are operating monopolies or cartels, the competition will not be fair. These matters cannot be handed back to be decided by national authorities without also endangering the Single Market.

 If the UK were to draw up a list of EU rules it would like to make in Westminster rather than Brussels, the other 26 could also do the same, but they might come up with a very different list. The process could become bogged down in serial  reopening of compromises, made years ago, on issues that have little relevance to the urgent existential threat  the EU faces today.

One gets the impression that many in the UK do not really care about that.

 The EU is still regarded by many in the UK as a foreign country, not a Union of which the UK itself has been an integral part for the past 40 years. Membership of the EU is seen as a convenience rather than as a commitment. If the price of satisfying UK voters is to cause more problems for the “foreigners”, in “Europe”, that is not seen by some UK political leaders as such a bad thing.

The difficulty is that the “foreigners” in Europe may not see it like that.

With so many genuinely urgent things to do, such as safeguarding the very existence of the EU itself, the other 26 member states may just not be inclined to devote time to a painstaking case by case analysis of a series of requests for new UK opt outs from some bits of some rulemaking authority, with UK opt ins to others, and to a judicious analysis of whether each one of these decisions might affect the integrity of the Single Market, either now or at some time in the future.

 And the European Court of Justice would certainly have difficulty interpreting the consistency of a special EU menu for one country with the basic freedoms for all on which the EU is based.

 There is also the old question of whether UK Ministers and MEPs should continue to have voting rights on things they are opting out of. As it is, one has to say that it is distinctly odd that the present Chairman of the Committee of the European Parliament that deals with euro currency matters, represents a constituency in the UK, which has no intention of joining the euro.

If,  as is likely at the end of its proposed renegotiation, the UK is dissatisfied with the result, because not enough powers are being handed back to Westminster, it will have little option but to recommend that the UK withdraws from the EU. 

 It is setting itself up now, to find itself in exactly that position, in 2016.

THE UK’S OPTIONS OUTSIDE THE EU

 This will require careful handling because 50% of UK exports go to the EU, and London is Europe’s main financial centre, for the time being anyway.

 How is the UK to protect these interests if it is outside the EU?

One possibility is to join Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein in the European Economic Area, which would guarantee full access for UK goods and services to the EU market. But the price for that would be having to implement all EU legislation that was relevant to the Single Market, and contribute to the EU budget, but without having any say in EU decisions.

That would be worse from a Euro sceptic point of view than the UK’s present position, even though it would guarantee continued access for the UK to the EU market for both goods and services.

The other possibility is to follow Switzerland and negotiate a series of bilateral trade deals with the EU. The UK would not be entering such negotiations from a position of strength, because it relies more on the EU market, than the EU relies on the UK market.

Switzerland has negotiated full access to the EU market for goods, but not for services. Services are the UK’s key export sector, so a Swiss style deal would not be attractive.

If Britain negotiated a Customs Union with the EU, like that of Turkey, it would find its trade policies with the rest of the world were still being determined in Brussels, but with less input from London than at present. Again it would also only have a guarantee of access for goods exports but not for services.

Finally, the UK might simply leave the EU, without negotiating any special deal. That would leave it paying tariffs on its exports to EU member states, including Ireland, and would necessitate the reintroduction of customs posts on the border in Ireland. It would undermine years of peacemaking by successive   Irish and UK Governments, and would cost thousands of jobs in export firms in both the UK and Ireland.

CONCLUSION

My sense is that the pressures that cause fracture in the EU derive from a lack of understanding among the general public of the extent to which their livelihoods  depend on economic developments in other  countries and of how unrealistic, in modern conditions, is an “ourselves alone” policy.

 Political leaders make little  effort to explain this, because to do so would undermine the  nationalist myths which brought most states into being in the first place, and also because it is often convenient to blame the EU for  the effects of decisions that were necessary but are unpalatable. For these reasons, little effort is made to forge any form of patriotic pride in the EU or its achievements.

No venue has been created in which an EU wide public opinion might be formed.

This must be done, if sufficient mutual understanding and support is to be created to allow the EU to create the degree of burden sharing and mutual supervision that is necessary to guarantee the long term  robustness of the euro, and thus of the EU itself.  In a word, the EU needs more democratic cement to hold itself together.

European Parliament elections are not truly European. They are 27 different elections, in 27 different countries, in which national issues predominate.

The European Parliament itself has refused to contemplate the election of some of its members from EU wide party lists, which would begin the process of creating an EU wide debate because it would necessitate an EU wide political campaign on behalf of the rival EU wide lists of candidates.

The President of the European Commission, and the President of the European Council, are selected in private meetings of heads of government. They do not have to win the votes of EU citizens, and consequently EU citizens do not have the feeling that they can vote the government of the EU out of office, in the same way that they can vote their national government out of office.

Thus the EU does not enjoy democratic legitimacy in quite the same way that national governments do.

As a member of the Convention that drafted what eventually became the Lisbon Treaty, I urged unsuccessfully that the EU should have a Presidential election on these lines.  I suggested that the President of the European Commission should be selected in a multi candidate election in which every EU citizen would vote, rather than be selected, as at present, by 27 heads of Government, meeting in private, to be approved in a single candidate vote in the European Parliament.

This proposal received almost no support at the time, although it has since been adopted as policy by the German CDU. If that had happened when it was proposed, the EU would now be in a much stronger democratic position to devise a more coherent response to the euro crisis, and to find a solution to the UK’s difficulties. The UK press would not be able to argue that EU leaders were “unelected”. The Commission, headed by a President with a full EU wide democratic mandate, would have more authority to propose solutions. The council of 27 heads of government would still play a vital role,  but the EU would be less constrained by the electoral timetables of individual countries, as is the case with the German election of 2013.

NAPLES

I have just spent an enjoyable day and a half in Naples, capital of the Italian south

It is a beautifully situated city, near Pompeii and the Amalfi coast, and endowed with some of the most remarkable churches in the world.

In one of these I discovered the tomb of an Irishman I had never heard of before, Luke Concannon born in Kilbegnet in Co Roscommon in 1747, and a Dominican priest, who was the first ever Catholic bishop of New York. He died in Naples in 1810, presumably on his way back to New York after a visit to Rome.  

I was struck by how clean and well kept Naples was, contrary to its reputation, and by the number of young people and small children on the crowded streets of the old city.

THE ITALIAN ECONOMY

Italy is facing many economic problems at the moment and I saw signs calling for demonstrations against the policies of the Monti Government.

Economic growth has been lagging in Italy since the 1990’s, and Italy has been hit particularly hard by Chinese competition, particularly in fashion goods. Meanwhile pay has increased far faster than productivity.

 Italy had the same balance of payments situation as Germany in 2000, whereas in 2010 Germany has a large surplus and Italy a large deficit.

THE IMPACT OF CHINA ON THE EURO ZONE HAS BEEN DIFFERENT IN ITALY THAN IT HAS  BEEN IN GERMANY

This is because Germany has been able to export engineering goods to the expanding Chinese market, while Italy has lost market share to China in its speciality, fashion goods.

 In a way, the opening up of China has created unanticipated new imbalances in the euro zone that have arisen since the currency was launched. Some of the German commentary on the euro crisis has ignored this fact.

UNLIKE IRELAND, ITALY ALMOST HAS A PRIMARY SURPLUS

Italy has a big Government debt, but most of this debt dates back to the 1990s, when services expanded while revenues were contracting. Today, Italy almost has a primary surplus on its Government accounts, in other words, it is collecting as much in tax, as it is spending on all Government services apart from interest on past debt. In this regard, it is in a much better situation that the rest of the euro zone.

In contrast, Ireland has a smaller government debt as a proportion of GDP, but has a substantial primary deficit....Ireland’s day to day spending on all services, apart from debt interest, still exceeds its day to day revenue by one of the largest margins in Europe.

Italians have a much lower level of private debt, 130% of GDP, as against 350% in Ireland, and 250% in Spain, Sweden and the Netherlands. There was no property bubble in Italy, in sharp contrast to Spain, something that needs to be explained.

Italy’s problem is that its medium term growth potential is less than that of either Ireland or Spain . This is partly because Italy has an older population, and partly because Ireland has a more modern industrial economy. 

Italy has a large black economy (15% of GDP), and it takes ages to enforce a contract or set up a business in Italy. A judicial process that would take 52 days in the Netherlands, 49 days in the US, or 183 days in Spain, would take 630 days in Italy!

ITALIAN BOYS LOSE OUT

Italy’s educational system is open to criticism.

A large number of students, particularly boys, drop out of school with no qualification at all, and its universities fail to prepare students for the jobs that actually exist. This is strange for a country, so many of whose prominent politicians are university professors! 

Only 15% of men, and 24% of women, in the 30 to 34 age group have a university education. 

As in other countries, the educational system is failing boys more than it is failing girls. Similarly, in Ireland, the unemployment rate among boys is higher than it is for girls.  

THE EUROPEAN UNION NEEDS TO BECOME MORE DEMOCRATIC, IF THE PEOPLE ARE TO GIVE SUSTAINED BACKING TO GREATER INTEGRATION.

I was at the second and third days of the European People’s Party Congress in Bucharest, Romania last week.

It was a huge, and well organised, event which took place the massive building of the Romanian Parliament. 

I spoke at a meeting, on the fringe of the Congress, on the euro crisis.

I said that the move to centralise control of government spending, and of structural reforms,  was necessary to get the euro crisis under control.

But I argued that it would not be politically viable in the longer run, unless it was accompanied by a visible, and dramatic, improvement in EU wide democracy.  

I said that decisions about spreading the tax burden, or opening markets to competition, involved taking resources and opportunities from some people, and giving them to others. Such decisions needed always to be, and to be seen to be, politically and democratically legitimated.

I argued that elections to the European Parliament were not sufficient legitimation for decisions that would be taken for all of Europe and for individual countries by the Commission, in a bargaining session behind closed doors in the Council of Ministers or in negotiations between civil servants.

I said that a European Parliament election did not create sufficient legitimation for the types of  decision that were  now to be taken at EU level. As presently arranged, European Parliament elections did not give citizens the sense that they could vote in, or vote out, the people who made decisions at EU level, in the same way as they could at national or local level.

The European Parliament election was really 27 different national elections, not a truly European one. It was not like a US Presidential election, where every American had to make the same choice, whatever state they live in.

In the absence of such a direct choice, people question the democratic legitimacy of EU level decisions, in a way that they do not question national or local decisions.

I suggested a way to solve the problem.

At the moment the President of the Commission is selected by 27 heads of government behind closed doors, and then voted on, in a one candidate vote by the European Parliament.

I proposed that he or she should be directly elected by the people of the EU in an open, contested,  multi candidate election, and every adult European having a vote.

Single candidate elections may have been enough for some people in the Soviet Union, but they are not the way to run the EU in the  21^st century!

Interview by Dermot Murnaghan for Sky News

ANY QUOTES USED MUST BE ATTRIBUTED TO MURNAGHAN, SKY NEWS

DERMOT MURNAGHAN: Now then, on Thursday the people of Ireland will be offered a choice to accept or reject stricter European plans for stricter budget disciplines. According to the latest polls the yes campaign is in the lead but opponents say the plans have no social or economic merit. Well joining me now from just outside Dublin is the former Prime Minister of Ireland, John Bruton, a very good morning to you Mr Bruton. Does Ireland feel the weight of European responsibility lying on its shoulders? If it should vote no, the implications for the euro could be dire.

JOHN BRUTON: Not really. In this case it will be enough for 12 of the 17 countries of the eurozone to vote yes to the Fiscal Compact for it to come in to effect so unless previous EU treaties, Ireland is not essential. On the other hand I think it is in Ireland’s interests to vote yes because that would give us the possibility of applying for funds from the European Civility Mechanism if we need them. It would also incorporate into our own domestic rules, better balanced budget controls on the government, to prevent governments – particularly in boom times – spending money that they ought not to spend and borrowing money that they ought not to borrow. The controls contained in this document are mainly to do with internal controls in Ireland rather than EU controls which exist anyway and they will I think be particularly applicable in boom times rather than in times of difficulty when you have to cut back anyway because you can’t borrow the money.

DM: The poll I referred to also tells us something interesting about Irish political life in that it seems on this issue to be dividing more than it has done in the past along class lines in that those more tending to vote no are those suffering most from austerity and recession, those at the bottom of the economic pile.

JB: I think that’s true, the polls seem to suggest that that is the case although in the last week, I think among people of the less well-off socio-economic group there has been an increase in the yes support in that camp because I think they realise that if we have to go for a second bail out, that would be a lot of it to support social welfare and healthcare schemes that benefit the less well-off people more than they benefit other people and obviously if we were cut off from funds, the people who would be first to suffer would be the least well-off. I think that message is beginning to percolate right across the community at this point.

DM: Does that tell us that those people minded, and I see on third of the electorate is still undecided, those people minded to vote no are stick of this tag that has been hung round Ireland’s neck of the poster boy for austerity, they may be beginning to feel that the Greeks are right and say let’s not take it any more, it doesn’t have to be this way?

JB: Well I think the truth of the matter is Ireland is doing well not because of austerity but in spite of austerity. We are doing well because we have a very big foreign direct investment base in this country, we are the leading attractor of foreign investment in the world, certainly in Europe, and that’s keeping our economy healthy. I think that that is something that depends very much on us being part of the European project, people invest here from America, from China, from other countries like that, because we are a fully subscribed member of the European Union. If we were to cast in doubt our commitment to the disciplines of the European Union and the euro, that would have an adverse effect on foreign direct investment which would have an immediate adverse effect on interest rates and on job creation here in this country

DM: Well leaving aside the referendum there, if Greece should exit the euro or be forced out of the euro, it’s said that this could spark a domino effect. Do you think that Ireland could be ejected from the euro or is it irrevocable, its membership?

JB: Well, legally it is not possible to eject a country from the euro. A country might decide that it had to leave but I don't think it’s likely that Greece will leave in the end because the effects on Greece would be so enormous, there would be an immediate four percentage point drop in the Greek gross domestic product, on top of all the drops that have occurred already, in the immediate effect of their leaving. If that were to lead to a break-up of the eurozone, you could have up to a twelve percent drop in income right across the eurozone, with the biggest sufferers actually not even being Greece but being Germany and France and, of course, Ireland. So I think keeping the eurozone together is a very, very high priority but clearly you have got to do that on a basis that you’re not simply giving money that is being poured down a black hole which never will come up again, you’ve got to have some controls or guarantees both in European law and in domestic law and what the fiscal compact treaty does is insist that we put it into our domestic law as well as relying on European controls which are there already under existing treaties.

DM: Just briefly, do you have any sympathy with people, maybe just to cause mischief, who have been saying in Ireland maybe you would have been better staying linked to sterling as you were forty years or so ago?

JB: Well at that time we had a situation where interest rate policy was determined in London without any Irish input and we went up and down with the fortunes of whatever suited the British economy as decided by people in Britain over which we had no say. In the eurozone we are one of 17 countries therefore we don’t determine the policy but we do have a say, we have representation in the European Central Bank, representation in the European Commission, in the European Parliament so we have more control, not complete control but more control of our economic future as a member of the eurozone than we would have if we were simply to unilaterally link ourselves to sterling and accept whatever was decided in London.

DM: Okay, Mr Bruton, thank you very much indeed for your time. John Bruton there with his thoughts on the referendum.

NO CAMPAIGN WANTS TO SADDLE CHILDREN WITH PARENTS DEBTS

Nobody loves austerity.

But if the alternative to austerity is adding to your debt , all you are doing is asking your children to undergo the austerity on your behalf. And asking them to undergo much  greater austerity , because they will have to pay  back interest as well. 

Young people, who are being targeted by the NO campaign should reflect on that.

The No campaigner actually want to saddle Irish  young people with a lifetime of paying off their parents debts, or of  leaving the country to avoid doing so.

That is the logical outcome of the crowd pleasing, truth avoiding, message of the No campaign.  

The Stability Treaty adds little to measures already in force under the authority of Treaties already ratified by the Irish people. 

It simply requires us to do what the Government is doing anyway, putting in place a debt brake  and independent Fiscal Advisory Council  to prevent phoney budgeting by Irish Governments in the future. 

Austerity has come to Europe because  lenders are suddenly wary of lending to Governments.  For everybody’s  sake, we have  got to  make lenders confident in lending to Governments again. 

Ireland’s ratification of the Stability Treaty would be a small ,but important, step in that process.